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Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that a household acts as if it were a single decision maker. Within this tradition, household demand is assumed to result from maximizing a unique utility function subject to a household budget constraint. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that this unitary model is at odds with observed household behavior; the associated restrictions of homogeneity, symmetry and negativity have been rejected at numerous occasions (e.g., Lacroix, 1997, and Chiappori, 1998) .
A more recent alternative, the so-called collective approach to household behavior (Chiappori, 1988 (Chiappori, , 1992 , explicitly takes account of the fact that multiperson households consist of several individuals with their own rational preferences; household decisions are then the Pareto e¢ cient outcomes of a bargaining process. This collective approach entails other behavioral restrictions than the unitary model. Interestingly enough, these restrictions seem to better …t the data than the unitary restrictions; e.g., Browning et al. (1994) , Fortin and Lacroix (1997) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Chiappori et al. (2002) and Vermeulen (2005) .
Still, the hitherto employed tests of the unitary and collective models are parametric in nature. Hence, they crucially depend on the functional form that is used for representing the preferences and/or the intrahousehold bargaining process. They do not only test the unitary or collective approach as such, but also an ad hoc functional speci…cation; a rejection of the unitary model may well be due to ill-speci…cation.
Nonparametric tests for consistency of observed behavior with utility maximization or Pareto e¢ ciency do not require any assumptions regarding the parametric form of utility functions or the intrahousehold bargaining process; see, e.g., Afriat (1967) , Varian (1982) , Chiappori (1988) and Snyder (2000) . These tests are solely based on revealed preference theory, which makes them particularly attractive for testing consistency of the data with theoretical behavioral models.
This directly suggests using nonparametric testing tools for comparing the empirical performance of the unitary and collective models. However, to the best of our knowledge, an in-depth nonparametric comparison has not yet been carried out. This paper wants to …ll that gap, by studying the speci…c case of household labor supply. Conveniently, our focus on labor supply also guarantees substantial price/wage variation across individuals, which can only bene…t the empirical comparison.
Our following assessment speci…cally concentrates on two types of (nonparametric) empirical performance measures: goodness-of-…t measures and power measures. We indeed believe that a fair comparison of the two behavioral models under study should complement a goodness-of-…t analysis with a power analysis: favorable goodness-of-…t results, indicating few violations of the behavioral restrictions, have little meaning if the behavioral implications have low power, i.e., optimizing behavior can hardly be rejected.
Our empirical evaluation uses representative Dutch data taken from the DNB Household Survey. The data set that we focus on is divided in three subsamples: working female singles, working male singles and couples where both spouses are working. We essentially discuss two types of comparisons: -First, we compare the empirical performance of the unitary model for singles with that for couples. The rationale of this comparison is that the standard unitary approach should always be fully applicable to singles, even if it does not well …t the observed behavior of couples. This …rst comparison should give us a deeper understanding of the harmless/harmful nature of the aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary modeling of couples'behavior.
-Second, we compare the empirical results of the collective model with those of the unitary model, both applied to the data of couples. Because the collective and unitary models evidently have di¤erent implications for couples'behavior, these results should give us a better insight into which of the models does the better job in describing multi-person household consumption behavior. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews the nonparametric methodology for testing the unitary and the collective labor supply models. In addition, we introduce the nonparametric goodness-of-…t and power measures. Section 3 presents the results of our application to Dutch household data. Section 4 concludes.
Methodology

Testing the unitary model
For the sake of compactness, we only discuss unitary consistency tests for couples with two working individuals (M and F ). Our discussion is directly translated to the singles'case.
The nonparametric approach starts from n observations for household consumption and the household members' labor supply. For each household i (i = 1; :::; n) we denote the net wage rate and leisure amount of individual I (I = M; F ) by w I i and l I i , respectively. (The leisure amount is computed from observed labor supply`I i = T l I i , with T the individuals' time endowment.) Next, we use y i and c i to respectively denote household i's nonlabor income and consumption. The household's nonlabor income aggregates the spouses' assignable unearned incomes and, possibly, unearned income that cannot be assigned to one of the spouses. It should be stressed that we focus on a standard static labor supply model; i.e., households are assumed not to save nor to draw down their assets (see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) . Finally, we represent the set of all observations by S = c i ; l i T ; without losing generality, we set the price of consumption to 1. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the data to be consistent with this utility maximization problem is that there exists a function v that rationalizes the household data, i.e., for all 
Varian (1982) has demonstrated that such a data rationalizing utility function exists if and only if the observed set S is consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP ). To formally state this last consistency condition, we …rst need the following revealed preference de…nition (using 1; w M ; w F 0 = w and c; l M ; l F 0 = l):
m l for some sequence of bundles (l i ; l j ; :::; l m ).
We can now de…ne GARP as: This de…nition expresses the idea that observation j is utility maximizing subject to its budget constraint if and only if it is expenditure minimizing over its 'better than'set; in the (empirical) GARP this last set is approximated by the 'revealed preferred'set RP j :
Consistency of S with GARP is easily tested: we …rst identify the sets RP j and subsequently check the expenditure minimization condition for each observation. See Varian (1982; p. 949) for an e¢ cient algorithm.
Testing the collective model
We focus on a collective model with egoistic preferences; preferences only depend on own consumption and leisure (Chiappori, 1988) . Moreover, we assume that there is no public consumption in the household. 1 Empirically, the modeling of this collective approach is somewhat more involved as the private consumption of each household member is usually not observed; labor supply data sets only reveal information on total household consumption (as the sum of earned and unearned incomes).
In the following, we denote individual I's private consumption by c Thus, given that the intrahousehold consumption allocation is not observed, we only need that there exists at least one feasible allocation entailing individual data f(c Snyder (2000) introduced an 'all-or-nothing'nonparametric test for the collective model. 2 In that test, either data satisfy collective rationality or they do not. We follow a di¤erent approach, induced by our speci…c focus on the goodness-of-…t of the alternative behavioral models. Our starting point is that the collective rationalization test boils down to standard GARP tests conditional upon an intrahousehold consumption allocation (c M i and c F i ). Speci…cally, we impute (unobserved) member-speci…c private consumption amounts by exploiting a systematic …nding in parametric studies of collective labor supply, namely the positive correlation between the male/female member's share of total nonlabor income and the corresponding individual wage (e.g., Chiappori et al., 2002, and Vermeulen, 2005) .
Using this, our nonparametric testing exercise considers the following pair of distributions for the female consumption share s 
is drawn from the …rst (second) distribution. We subsequently select the combination of shares with the highest number of individual (male and female) household members passing GARP. This combination is used for comparing the empirical performance of the collective model with that of the unitary model. 3 As a …nal note, we must emphasize that this approach does not guarantee the most favorable treatment of the collective model: to ensure computational tractability, our procedure restricts attention to a limited number of possible combinations of intrahousehold allocations; there may well exist other, noninvestigated, combinations that are associated with an even higher number of individuals consistent with GARP. We can therefore state that our empirical analysis implicitly gives the 'bene…t of the doubt'to the unitary model.
Empirical performance: goodness-of-…t
The consistency tests reviewed above are 'sharp'tests; they only tell us whether observations are exactly optimizing in terms of the behavioral model that is under evaluation. However, as argued by Varian (1990) , exact optimization is not a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, we want to know whether the behavioral model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed behavior; for most purposes, 'nearly optimizing behavior' is just as good as 'optimizing' behavior. Varian's argument is all the more valid in the context of comparing theoretical behavioral models: we are primarily interested in the extent to which one model '…ts'the observed data better than the other model. Therefore, our following assessment will be based on measures of goodness-of-…t.
Our goodness-of-…t measure is the 'improved violation index'(or 'e¢ ciency index') proposed by Varian (1993; based on Afriat, 1973 ; see also Cox, 1997) , which indicates the degree to which the data are 'optimizing'(or 'e¢ cient') in the sense of the evaluated behavioral model. More speci…cally, this index gives for each observation the minimal perturbation of the expenditure level that guarantees consistency of the observed set S with GARP. See Varian (1993) and Cox (1997) for in-depth formal discussions of this goodness-of-…t measure.
Empirical performance: power
We compute six di¤erent power measures. A …rst distinction relates to the consumption data that is used. The …rst data set (used for
For each data set we compute two types of power measures proposed by Bronars (1987) and one additional measure. Bronars'two measures essentially pertain to the 'mimicking'of irrational behavior à la Becker (1962) , by means of a speci…c randomization procedure for constructing irrational consumption bundles. Each power measure then captures the probability of detecting that irrational behavior, which acts as the alternative hypothesis to the null hypothesis that is tested. Bronars'…rst measure, labeled Power1a (Power2a) for the …rst (second) data set, is based on the alternative hypothesis that consumers choose bundles randomly from a uniform distribution across all bundles in their budget hyperplanes. Since this …rst power measure may entail quite extreme behavior (e.g., consumers jumping from one 'corner'of the budget line to another 'corner'), we also applied Bronars'second measure, labeled Power1b (Power2b) for the …rst (second) data set.This alternative measure makes extreme (irrational) behavior less likely than the …rst one. (See Bronars, 1987, for formal de…nitions of both measures).
Our additional third power measure (labeled Power1c and Power2c when applied to the …rst and second data set respectively) assumes that consumers randomly draw consumption and leisure bundles from the empirical distribution as observed in the data. The rationale for this additional measure pertains to the observation that, e.g., singles who work the same number of hours can never be involved in a GARP violation vis-à-vis each other. Since observed working hours are discretely distributed with an important mass point at a weekly labor supply of 40 hours for males, and with mass points at 40 and 32 hours for females, such a situation may apply to a nonnegligible number of observations. Our third power measure accounts for this potential problem and provides a measure for its importance. The measure basically implies that we remain ignorant about the alternative hypothesis to the model under study. Still, we recognize that this power measure may be subject to some criticism. Most importantly, and contrary to Beckerian irrational behavior, random behavior based on the empirical distribution may seem logically inconsistent since it potentially mixes both rational and irrational behavioral aspects. One should take into account that both the null hypothesis (the model under study) and the (unspeci…ed) alternative hypothesis give rise to exactly the same distributions.
For a given data set and randomization procedure, the speci…c construction of the power measures …rst simulates irrational/random behavior for each observation, and subsequently checks consistency with GARP for each observation. In our empirical application, we repeat this procedure 200 times. The proportion of rejections of GARP (over these 200 replications) then gives the probability of detecting irrational/random behavior of each observation, given random behavior of the other observations. Hence, for each behavioral model that we evaluate we measure power in each element of the observed set S. This practice contrasts with e.g. Bronars (1987) and Cox (1997) , who provide overall power measures that are based on the entire sample. Their measures reveal the probability that random behavior of at least one observation in the sample is detected. In our opinion, evaluating power at the level of individual observations is more informative. For example, it provides a more detailed insight into the extent to which the di¤erent observations can cause rejection of the model under study; we believe that there is a stronger case for a model that has high power in many observations than for a model with high power in only a few observations. Also, an observation-speci…c power measure naturally links up with our observation-speci…c goodness-of-…t measure; persistently high goodness-of-…t values for a given sample of observations are all the more convincing evidence in favor of a particular behavioral model if they are complemented with high power values for the same sample.
Application
Data and methodological issues
We use 11 waves of the DNB Household Survey (formerly known as the CentER Savings Survey), drawn from 1995 until 2005. The data are representative for the Dutch population and are collected every year for a panel of more than 2000 households. The survey contains a rich amount of economic, socio-demographic and psychological variables. We focus on three subsamples: female singles, male singles and couples. The …rst two subsamples consist of female and male singles that meet the following criteria: no children, aged between 25 and 55 and employed. The third subsample consists of (de-facto) couples, where the household members meet the same criteria as the selected singles. To minimize the impact of measurement error, we trimmed out from each subsample those households that include a (female/male) member with a wage that lies above the 97.5 percentile or below the 2.5 percentile of the empirical (female/male) wage distribution. This yields samples of 522 single females, 888 single males and 586 couples. Table 3 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for each subsample. Cox (1997) and Snyder (2000) conduct nonparametric tests of labor sup-ply behavior on time-series micro-data and, hence, exclude preference variation over time. Our analysis deviates in that we assume constant preferences in each subsample (female singles, male singles and couples); in each subsample, all observations correspond to the same preferences but to di¤erent price regimes. Our motivation for this particular preference homogeneity assumption is threefold. Firstly, the DNB Household Survey was subject to substantial attrition between 1995 and 2005. Only a relatively small number of households were observed in all the waves, which implies too few households with 11 consecutive observations for robust nonparametric testing based on time-series data. Secondly, our selection criteria ensure relatively homogeneous subsamples, which makes that our equal preference assumption does not seem overly strong. 4 Finally, and importantly, recall that we focus on goodness-of-…t measures in our following analysis. Obviously, this practice anticipates some preference variation over households. When restricting to the 'sharp' GARP test, we would conclude rejection for all three subsamples; most observations have an index value that is less than 100%. We note that this result should not be very surprising in view of our preference homogeneity assumption. It seems more meaningful to look at the entire distribution of the goodness-of-…t measure.
Singles versus couples
[ Figure 1 about here] When considering the c.d.f.'s more closely, we observe important di¤erences between couples and singles. Firstly, we …nd that 39% of the female singles and 28% of the male singles are fully e¢ cient, as opposed to only 12% of the couples. Secondly, and more importantly, the index values of couples are generally below those of singles; the couples'distribution is stochastically dominated by the two singles'distributions. One-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests con…rm this overall picture: the null hypothesis of equal distributions of couples on the one hand and male and female singles on the other hand is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the couples'index systematically lies below the respective singles'indexes; see Table 1 .
As discussed above, it is recommendable to complement this goodness-of-…t analysis with a power analysis. Figure 2 presents the c.d.f.'s of the individually calculated Power1a indexes for single females, single males and couples. 6 This …gure reveals high power for most observations: 98% of the couples, 96% of the male singles and 95% of the female singles have a power index value that exceeds 95%; for these observations, irrational random behavior will be detected with a probability of at least 95%. More generally, while the overall power for couples appears to be slightly higher than for female and male singles, Figure  2 suggests that the di¤erences remain marginal. This impression is con…rmed by one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests: we cannot reject (at any reasonable signi…cance level) equality of the c.d.f.'s in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the power index values for female and male singles are lower than those for couples; see Table 1 .
We obtain exactly the same qualitative conclusions for the power measures Power2a, Power1b and Power2b (see also Table 1 ): power index values are generally very high, while equality of the c.d.f.'s for the three subsamples cannot be rejected. Although power index values are also relatively high for the power measures Power1c and Power2c, equality of the c.d.f.'s for the three subsamples is rejected. At this point, it is worth recalling the potential criticism on the latter power measures in Section 2.4. From that perspective, these power measures (especially for singles) only give some indication about the importance of the mass points in the empirical distribution (at 40 hours for example) and the consequent failure to come to a GARP rejection for observations at these mass points. 7 We conclude that the relatively poor performance of the unitary model for describing observed couples'behavior (when compared to singles'behavior) can hardly be attributed solely to higher power of the model for the associated couples'consistency tests. In our opinion, these …ndings strongly question the harmless nature of the aggregation assumptions in the unitary approach to modeling couples'behavior.
[ Figure 2 about here]
[ Table 1 about here]
Unitary versus collective model
Our previous …ndings cast doubts on the usefulness of the unitary model for analyzing couples'behavior. As a natural next step, we investigate whether the collective approach provides a better alternative for modeling couples'behavior, by comparing its empirical performance with that of the unitary model. Like before, our unitary results refer to GARP tests at the aggregate household level. By contrast, our collective results are obtained from applying GARP tests to the individual members of each couple, hereby using the intrahousehold allocations obtained by the procedure described in Section 2.2. Figure 3 presents the c.d.f.'s of the goodness-of-…t measure for couples (in the unitary model) and female and male household members (in the collective model). In line with our earlier results, more individuals than aggregate households behave consistently with the utility maximization hypothesis: 26% of the men and 14% of the women are 100% e¢ cient, while only 12% of the couples attain an improved violation index value of 100%. In fact, Figure 3 reveals a picture that is roughly similar to that in Figure 1 : the (unitary) couples'distribution is stochastically dominated by the (collective) distributions of the male and female household members. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results in Table  2 provide further evidence in support of the collective model: the null hypothesis of equal c.d.f.'s is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the couples'improved violation index systematically lies below that for women and men in the collective model.
[ Figure 3 about here] Again, we complement this goodness-of-…t analysis with a power analysis. Our power results persistently indicate that the better …t of the collective model is not due to lower power. For example, Figure 4 clearly shows that the distribution of the Power1a values is practically the same for couples (in the unitary model) and individuals (in the collective model). This observation is formalized in Table 2 : one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that equality of the c.d.f.'s of the power indexes cannot be rejected at any reasonable signi…cance level. Moreover, the power indexes are generally high: 98% of the couples (in the unitary model), 98% of the females and 98% of the males (in the collective model) have a power index that amounts to at least 95%. Just like in Section 3.2, we checked the sensitivity of these power results. Interestingly, the power measures Power2a, Power1b and Power2b entail the same qualitative conclusions as Power1a (see also Table 2 ). As for the measures Power1c and Power2c, we only reject equality of the c.d.f.'s when comparing male individuals (in the collective model) with couples (in the unitary model); equality of the c.d.f.'s cannot be rejected when comparing female individuals with couples. Moreover, also these measures imply relatively high power indexes.
In our opinion, these results provide strong enough evidence to argue that the collective approach performs signi…cantly better than the unitary approach for modeling couples'labor supply behavior. In fact, this argument becomes all the more convincing when taking into account our rather rudimentary procedure to model the distribution of household consumption over the di¤erent household members; more re…ned allocation rules can only bene…t the relative performance of the collective model.
[ Figure 4 about here]
[ Table 2 about here]
Conclusion
We compared the empirical performance of the unitary model to describe household labor supply behavior with that of the more recently developed collective model. Our …ndings strongly suggest using the collective model for analyzing the behavior of households consisting of multiple individuals: -First, we found that the unitary model performs signi…cantly worse when applied to couples than when applied to singles. As these results cannot be attributed to power di¤erences, we conclude that they signal violations of the preference aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary approach, i.e., that multi-person households behave as single decision makers.
-Second, and probably more importantly, a direct comparison of the collective model with the unitary model provided additional evidence to support the use of the collective model: it …ts observed couples'behavior much better than the unitary model. Again, this signi…cant di¤erence cannot be explained by power di¤erences. Hence, our …ndings do not only indicate that the unitary approach is too restrictive for modeling the behavior of multi-person households, but also that the collective model constitutes a more promising alternative. < 0 . 9 2 < 0 . 9 3 < 0 . 9 4 < 0 . 9 5 < 0 . 9 6 < 0 . 9 7 < 0 . 9 8 < 0 . 9 9 < 1 < = 1 < 0 . 9 1 < 0 . 9 2 < 0 . 9 3 < 0 . 9 4 < 0 . 9 5 < 0 . 9 6 < 0 . 9 7 < 0 . 9 8 < 0 . 9 9 Power1a (Power2a ) is Bronars'(1987) …rst power measure applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data; Power1b (Power2b) is Bronars' (1987) second power measure applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data; while Power1c (Power2c) is based on random drawings from the empirical hours distribution and applied to observed (e¢ ciency corrected) data. Entries are in percent.
